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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problem of locating
the information source with sparse observations. We assume
that a piece of information spreads in a network following a
heterogeneous susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model and
that a small subset of infected nodes are reported, from which we
need to find the source of the information. We adopt the sample
path based estimator developed in [1], and prove that on infinite
trees, the sample path based estimator is a Jordan infection
center with respect to the set of observed infected nodes. In other
words, the sample path based estimator minimizes the maximum
distance to observed infected nodes. We further prove that the
distance between the estimator and the actual source is upper
bounded by a constant independent of the number of infected
nodes with a high probability on infinite trees. Our simulations
on tree networks and real world networks show that the sample
path based estimator is closer to the actual source than several
other algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we are interested in locating the source
of information that spreads in a network by using sparse
observations. The solution to this problem has important appli-
cations such as locating the sources of epidemics, news/rumors
in social networks or online computer virus. The problem
has been studied in [2], [3], [4], [5] under a homogeneous
susceptible-infection (SI) model and in [1] under a homo-
geneous susceptible-infection-recover (SIR) model, assuming
that a complete snapshot of the network is given.
While [2], [3], [4], [5], [1] answered some fundamental
questions about information source detection in large-scale
networks, a complete snapshot of a real world network,
which may have hundreds of millions of nodes, is expensive
to obtain. Furthermore, these works assume homogeneous
infection across links and homogeneous recovery across nodes,
but in reality, most networks are heterogeneous. For example,
people close to each other are more likely to share rumors
and epidemics are more infectious in the regions with poor
medical care systems. Therefore, it is important to take sparse
observations and network heterogeneity into account when
locating information sources. In this paper, we consider a
heterogeneous SIR model and assume only a small subset of
infected nodes are reported to us. The goal is to identify the
information source in a heterogeneous network by using sparse
observations.
We use the sample path based approach developed in [1]
for locating the information source with sparse observations.
Surprisingly, we find that the sample path based estimator is
robust to network heterogeneity and the number of observed
infected nodes. In particular, our results show that even under
a heterogeneous SIR model and with sparse observations, the
sample path based estimator remains to be a Jordan infection
center in infinite trees, where the Jordan infection center with
a partial observation is the node that minimizes the maximum
distance to observed infected nodes. We further show that in
an infinite tree, the distance between a Jordan infection center
and the actual source can be bounded by a value independent
of the size of infected subnetwork with a high probability,
where the infected subnetwork is the subnetwork that consists
of nodes are either infected or recovered and is a connected
component. Assume the size of the infected subnetwork is n,
the result says that a Jordan infection center is a distance of
O(1) from the actual source.
We remark that the locations of the Jordan centers only
depend on the network topology and are independent of the
infection and recovery probabilities, so the sample path based
estimators (or the Jordan infection centers) are also robust
to the information diffusion models, which makes it very
appealing in practice since the accurate knowledge of the SIR
parameters can be difficult to measure in reality.
A. Related Works
Other than [2], [3], [4], [5], [1], there are several related
works in this area including: (1) detecting the first adopter
of an innovation based on game theory [6], in which the
maximum likelihood estimator is derived but the computa-
tional complexity of finding the estimator is exponential in
the number of nodes; (2) distinguishing epidemic infection
from random infection under the SI model [7]; (3) geospatial
abduction which deals with reasoning certain locations in a
two-dimensional geographical area that can explain observed
phenomena [8], [9]. A recent paper [10] also proposed a
dynamic message passing algorithm (DMP) to detect the
information source under a general SIR model with complete
or partial observations. However, the algorithm needs the
complete information of infection and recovery probabilities.
In addition, the complexity of DMP is very high under partial
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2observations since almost all nodes in the network are candi-
dates of the source, and the calculation needs to be repeated
for every possible candidate. In the simulations, we will show
that our algorithm significantly outperforms DMP in terms
of both accuracy and speed. We will see that our algorithm
is 400× faster even when we limit the DMP algorithm to a
subnetwork.
II. A HETEROGENEOUS SIR MODEL
In this section, we introduce the heterogeneous SIR model
for information propagation. Different from the homogeneous
SIR model in which infection and recovery probabilities are
both homogeneous [1], the heterogeneous SIR model we
consider allows different infection probabilities at different
links and different recovery probabilities at different nodes.
Consider an undirected graph G = {V, E}, where V is the
set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Denote by (u, v) ∈ E
the edge between node u and node v. Each node v ∈ V
has three states: susceptible (S), infected (I), and recovered
(R). Time is slotted. At the beginning of each time slot,
each infected node attempts to contact all its susceptible
neighbors. A contact from node u to node v succeeds with
probability quv. A susceptible node becomes infected after
being successfully contacted by one of its infected neighbors.
At the middle of each time slot, an infected node, if it is
infected before the current time slot, recovers with probability
pv. A recovered node cannot be infected again. We assume that
contacts succeed independently across links and time slots; and
nodes recover independently across nodes and time slots.
Consider a network shown in Figure 1, where node e is in
the susceptible state, nodes a and c are in the infected state
and nodes b and d are in the recovered state. Then at the next
time slot, node e becomes infected with probability
1− (1− qae)(1− qce),
and nodes a and c recover with probability pa and pc,
respectively.
a
b
c
d
e
Fig. 1: An example for illustrating the heterogeneous SIR
model
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formally define the problem of informa-
tion source detection. Adopting the notation in [1], we define
Xv(t) to be the states of node v at the end of time slot t such
that
Xv(t) =
 S, if v is in state S at time t;I, if v is in state I at time t;
R, if v is in state R at time t.
Let X(t) = {Xv(t) : ∀v ∈ V} denote the state of all nodes in
the network at time t.
In this paper, we assume that we only have one partial
snapshot of the network, which is a subset of the infected
nodes. This observation can be sparse, and details will be given
in the next section. We assume that the states of other nodes
are unknown. We let Yv denote the state of node v in the
snapshot such that
Yv =
{
1, if node v is observed to be infected;
0, otherwise.
Let Y = {Yv : ∀v ∈ V}. We denote by v∗ the information
source. The problem of information source detection is to
locate v∗ based on the partial observation Y and the network
topology G.
Due to recovery and partial observations, all nodes in the
network are potential candidates of the information source.
The maximum likelihood estimator of the problem is therefore
computationally expensive to find as pointed out in [1]. In this
paper, we follow the sample path based approach proposed in
[1] to find an estimator of v∗.
Since X(t) is the state of the network at time t, the sequence
{X(τ)}0≤τ≤t specifies the complete infection process. There-
fore, we call X[0, t] = {X(τ) : 0 ≤ τ ≤ t} a sample path.
We further define a function F (·) such that
F (Xv(t)) =
{
1, if Xv(t) = I and v is observed;
0, otherwise.
This function maps the actual state of a node to the observed
state of the node. F(X(t)) = Y if and only if F (Xv(t)) =
Yv,∀v ∈ V. The optimal sample path X∗[0, t∗] is defined to
be the most likely sample path that results in the observed
snapshot, i.e., it solves the following optimization problem:
X∗[0, t∗] = argmaxt,X[0,t]∈X (t) Pr(X[0, t]), (1)
where X (t) = {X[0, t]|F(X(t)) = Y}. The source associates
with X∗[0, t∗] is called the sample path based estimator.
It is proved in [1] that the sample path based estimator
on an infinite tree is a Jordan infection center under the
homogeneous SIR model with a complete snapshot. The focus
of this paper is to identify the sample path based estimator
under the heterogeneous SIR model with sparse observations.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we summarize the main results of this paper.
A. Main result 1: The Jordan infection centers as the sample
path based estimators
In our theoretical analysis, we consider tree networks with
infinitely many levels (or called infinite trees) to derive the
sample path based estimator under the heterogeneous SIR
3model with a partial snapshot. Let IY denote the set of
observed infected nodes. We define the observed infection
eccentricity e˜(v, IY) of node v to be the maximum distance
between v and any observed infected node where the distance
is defined to be the shortest distance between two nodes.
The Jordan infection centers of the partial snapshot are then
defined to be the nodes with the minimum observed infection
eccentricity. The following theorem states that on an infinite
tree, the sample path based estimator is a Jordan infection
center of the partial snapshot.
Theorem 1. Consider an infinite tree and assume the partial
snapshot Y contains at least one infected node. The sample
path based estimator, denoted by v†, is a Jordan infection
center, i.e.,
v† ∈ argmax
v∈V
e˜(v, IY).

The proof of this theorem consists of the following key
steps.
1) In the first step, we focus on the sample paths originated
from node v (i.e., we assume node v is the source). We
consider two groups of sample paths: Xv(t) and Xv(t + 1),
where Xv(t) is the set of the sample paths that are originated
from v, have time duration t, and are consistent with the
partial snapshot, i.e., F(X(t)) = Y for any X[0, t] ∈ Xv(t).
The set Xv(t+ 1) is similarly defined. We show that for any
t ≥ e˜(v, IY), the sample path with the highest probability in
Xv(t) occurs more likely than the one in Xv(t+ 1). In other
words,
max
X[0,t]∈Xv(t)
Pr(X[0, t]) > max
X[0,t+1]∈Xv(t+1)
Pr(X[0, t+ 1]).
As a consequence of this result, we conclude that the sample
path that has the highest probability among those originated
from node v has a duration of e˜(v, IY) (the observed infection
eccentricity of node v). This result will be proved in Lemma
3 in Section VI.
2) In the second step, we consider two neighboring nodes,
say nodes u and v; and assume node v has a smaller observed
infection eccentricity than node u. Based on Lemma 3, we
will prove that the optimal sample path associated with node
v occurs with a higher probability than that of node u. The
key idea is to construct a sample path originated from node v
based on the optimal sample path originated from node u and
show that it occurs with a higher probability. This result will
be proved in Lemma 4 in Section VI.
3) We will finally prove that starting from any node, there
exists a path from the node to a Jordan infection center such
that the observed infection eccentricity strictly decreases along
the path. Consider an example in Figure 2. Nodes b and f are
two observed infected nodes. So node a is a Jordan infection
center with observed infection eccentricity 1. The path from
node e to node a is
e→ d→ c→ b→ a,
along which the observed infection eccentricity decreases as
5→ 4→ 3→ 2→ 1.
By repeatedly using Lemma 4, it can be shown that the
optimal sample path originated from a Jordan infection center
occurs with a higher probability than the optimal sample path
originated from a node which is not a Jordan infection center,
which implies the sample path based estimator must be a
Jordan infection center.
a
b c d
e
f
Fig. 2: The key intuition behind Theorem 1
B. Main result 2: An O(1) bound on the distance between a
Jordan infection center and the actual information source
Unlike the maximum likelihood estimator, the sample path
estimator is not guaranteed that the estimator is the node that
most likely leads to the observation. It has been shown in [1]
that on tree networks and under the homogeneous SIR model,
the distance between the estimator and the actual source is a
constant with a high probability. It is easy to see that with
a partial observation, the distance between the estimator and
the actual source cannot be bounded if the observed infection
nodes are arbitrarily chosen. In this paper, we consider a class
of fairly general sampling algorithms that generate the partial
observation (and maybe sparse). The sampling algorithms have
the following property: for any set of M infected nodes,
the probability that at least one node in the set is reported
approaches to one as M goes to infinity. We call such a
sampling algorithm unbiased, in other words, any subset of
infected nodes is likely to contain an observed infected node
when the size of the subset is large enough. Note that if
an infected node is reported with probability at least δ for
some δ > 0, independent of other nodes, then it satisfies the
property above. Our second main result is that the sample
path estimator is within a constant distance from the actual
source independent of the size of the infected subnetwork if
the sampling algorithm is unbiased. We also emphasize that
the observation generated by an unbiased sampling algorithm
can be very sparse since we only require one observed infected
node is reported with a high probability among M nodes when
M is sufficiently large.
Theorem 2. Consider an infinite tree. Let gmin be the lower
bound on the number of children, and qmin > 0 be the lower
bound on q. Assume gmin > 1, gminqmin > 1, and the
observed infection topology Y contains at least one infected
node and is generated by an unbiased sampling algorithm.
Then given  > 0, the distance between the sample path
4estimator and the actual source is d with probability 1 − ,
where d is independent of the size of the infected subnetwork.
In other words, the distance is O(1) with a high probability.
.
L
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b
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f
Fig. 3: The key intuition behind Theorem 2
The idea of the proof is illustrated using Figure 3, which
consists of the following key steps:
1) We first define a one-time-slot infection subtree to be
a subtree of the infected subnetwork such that each node on
the subtree is infected in the next time slot after parent is
infected, except the source node. Note that the depth of a
one-time-slot infection subtree grows by one deterministically
until it terminates. We further say a node survives at time t
if it is the root of a one-time-slot infection subtree which has
not terminated by time t.
2) In the first step, we will prove that there exist at least
two survived nodes within a distance L from the information
source. In Figure 3, node a is the information source, and
nodes b and c are two survived nodes.
3) In the second step, we will show that with a high
probability, at least one infected node at the bottom of a
one-time-slot infection subtree, which has not terminated, is
observed under an unbiased sampling algorithm. In Figure 3,
nodes d and f are two sampled nodes corresponding to the
two one-time-slot infection subtrees starting from nodes b and
c, respectively.
4) Since a one-time-slot infection subtree grows by one
deterministically at each time slot, the depth of a one-time-
slot infection subtree is t − tIk, where k is the root node
of the one-time-slot infection subtree. Recall that the Jordan
infection centers minimize the maximum distance to observed
infected nodes, so a Jordan infection center must be within a
O(1) distance from the two survived nodes (nodes b and c).
Considering Figure 3, we know that the actual source (node
a) has an infection eccentricity ≤ t since the information can
propagate at most t hops at time t. So the infection eccentricity
of the Jordan infection centers is no more than t according to
the definition. Assume node e in Figure 3 is a Jordan infection
center, then it is within a distance of O(t) from nodes d and
f, so is within a distance of O(1) from nodes b and c. Since
nodes b and c are no more than L hops from the actual source
a, we can conclude that the distance between the actual source
a and the estimator e is O(1).
C. Reverse Infection Algorithm
The Jordan infection centers for general graphs can be
identified by the reverse infection algorithm proposed in [1].
In the algorithm, each observed infected node broadcasts its
identity (ID) to its neighbors. All nodes in the network record
the distinct IDs they received. When a node receives a new
distinct ID, it records it and then broadcasts it to its neighbors.
This process stops when there is a node who receives the IDs
from all observed infected nodes. It is easy to verify the set
of nodes who first receive all infected IDs is the set of Jordan
infection centers. When there are multiple Jordan infection
centers in the graph, we select the one with the maximum
infection closeness centrality as the information center. The
infection closeness centrality is defined as the inverse of the
sum of the distances from one node to all observed infected
nodes.
D. Discussion: Robustness
According to the two main results above, we know that the
sample path based estimator remains to be a Jordan infection
center. This is a somewhat surprising result since the locations
of the Jordan infection centers are determined by the topology
of the network, and are independent of the parameters of the
heterogeneous SIR model. In other words, the locations of the
Jordan infection centers remain the same for different SIR
processes as long as the set of observed infected nodes is
the same. This property suggests that the sample path based
estimator is a robust estimator and can be used in the case
when the parameters of the SIR model are unknown, which is
a very desirable property since knowing these parameters can
be difficult in practice.
In the simulations, we also consider a weighted graph with
the link weights chosen proportionally according to the SIR
parameters and use the weighted Jordan infection centers as
the estimator. Interestingly, we will see that the performance
is worse than the unweighted Jordan infection centers, which
again demonstrates the robustness of the sample path based
estimator.
Furthermore, the main results hold as long as the sampling
algorithm is unbiased and are independent of the number of
samples. So the results are valid for sparse observations and
are robust to the number of observations.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the reverse
infection algorithm for the heterogeneous SIR model on differ-
ent networks including tree networks and real world networks.
We first describe the heterogeneous SIR model we used in
the simulation. Each edge e ∈ E is assigned with a weight
qe which is uniformly distributed over (0, 1). The infection
time over each edge e ∈ E is geometrically distributed with
mean 1/qe. Similarly, each node v ∈ V is assigned with a
weight pv generated by an uniform distribution over (0, 1)
and the recovery time is geometrically distributed with mean
1/pv. The information source is randomly selected. The total
number of infected and recovered nodes in each infection
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(a) Regular Tree
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Sample Probability σ
Av
er
ag
e 
Di
st
an
ce
 to
 A
ct
ua
l S
ou
rc
e
 
 
RI
CC
wRI
wCC
(b) Binomial Tree
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(c) The Power Grid Network
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(d) The Internet Autonomous Systems Network
Fig. 4: The Performance of RI, CC, wRI and wCC on Different Graphs
graph is within the range of [100, 300]. Each infected node v in
the infection graph reports with probability σ, independently.
The snapshots used in the simulations have at least one
infected node. We changed σ and evaluated the performance
on different networks.
We briefly introduce the three main algorithms which were
used to compare with the reverse infection algorithm (RI).
1) Closeness centrality algorithm (CC): The closeness cen-
trality algorithm selects the node with the maximum infection
closeness as the information source.
2) Weighted reverse infection algorithm (wRI): The
weighted reverse infection algorithm selects the node with the
minimum weighted infection eccentricity as the information
source where the weighted infection eccentricity is similar to
the infection eccentricity except that the length of a path is
defined to be the sum of the link weights instead of the number
of hops, and the link weight is the average time it takes to
spread the information over the link, i.e., b1/qec on edge e.
3) Weighted closeness centrality algorithm (wCC): The
weighted closeness centrality algorithm selects the node with
the maximum weighted infection closeness as the information
source.
A. Tree Networks
We first evaluated the performance of the RI algorithm on
tree networks.
1) Regular Trees: A g-regular tree is a tree where each node
has g neighbors. We set the degree g = 5 in our simulations.
We varied the sample probability σ from 0.01 to 0.1. The
simulation results are summarized in Figure 4a, which shows
the average distance between the estimator and the actual
information source versus the sampling probability. When the
sample probability increases, the performance of all algorithms
improve. When the sample probability is larger than 6%, the
average distance becomes stable which means a small number
of infected nodes is enough to obtain a good estimator. We
also notice that the average distance of RI is smaller than all
other algorithms and is less than one hop when σ ≥ 0.04. wRI
has a similar performance with RI when the sample probability
is small (=0.01) but becomes much worse when the sample
probability increases.
2) Binomial Trees: We further evaluated the performance
of RI and other algorithms on binomial trees T (ξ, β) where
the number of children of each node follows a binomial
distribution such that ξ is the number of trials and β is
the success probability of each trial. In the simulations, we
selected ξ = 10 and β = 0.4. Again, we varied σ from 0.01
to 0.1. The results are shown in Figure 4b. Similar to the
regular trees, the performance of RI dominates CC, wRI and
wCC, and the difference in terms of the average number of
hops is approximately one when σ ≥ 0.03.
6B. Real World Networks
In this section, we conducted experiments on two real world
networks: the Internet Autonomous Systems network (IAS)1,
and the power grid network (PG)2.
1) The Power Grid Network: The power grid network has
4,941 nodes and 6,594 edges. On average, each node has
1.33 edges. So the power grid network is a sparse network.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 4c. In the power
grid network, we can see that RI and wRI have similar
performance, and both outperform CC and wCC by at least
one hop when σ ≥ 0.04.
2) The Internet Autonomous Systems Network: The Internet
Autonomous Systems network is the data collected on March,
31st, 2001. There are 10,670 nodes and 22,002 edges in the
network. The simulation results are shown in Figure 4d. wRI
and wCC always perform worse than RI. Although RI and
CC have similar performance when the sample probability is
large, RI outperforms CC when σ ≤ 0.03.
C. RI versus DMP
We finally compared the performance of RI and DMP with
sparse observations. We conducted the simulation on the power
grid network and fixed the sample probability to be 10%.
Under this setting, the complexity of DMP is very high since
the DMP computation needs to be repeated for every node in
the network. Since nodes far away from the observed infected
nodes are not likely to be the information source, we ran DMP
over a subset of nodes close to the Jordan infection centers to
reduce the complexity of the algorithm.
We tested the speed of RI and DMP on a machine with 1.8
GB memory, 4 cores 2.4 GHz Intel i5 CPU and Ubuntu 12.10.
The algorithms are implemented in Python 2.7. On average, it
took RI 0.57 seconds to locate the estimator for one snapshot
and took DMP 229.12 seconds. So RI is much faster than
DMP.
Figure 5 shows the CDF of the distance from the estimator
to the actual source under DMP and RI. We can see that RI
dominates DMP, in particular, 71% of the estimators under RI
are no more than 7 hops from the actual source comparing to
57% under DMP. Therefore, RI outperforms DMP in terms
of both speed and accuracy. We remark that we did not
compare the performance of RI and DMP on the Internet
Autonomous System (IAS) network because the complexity
of running DMP on a large size network like the IAS network
is prohibitively high.
VI. PROOFS
In this section, we present the proofs of the main results.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Denote by IY = {v|Yv = 1} the set of observed infected
nodes and HY = {v|Yv = 0} the set of unobserved nodes.
Given a node v, define the optimal time t∗v to be
t∗v , argt max
t,X[0,t]∈X (t)
Pr (X[0, t]|v is information source) ,
1Available at http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
2Available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼mejn/netdata/
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Fig. 5: The CDF of RI and DMP on the Power Grid Network
i.e., it is the duration of the optimal sample path with node v
as the information source.
Lemma 3. (Time Inequality) Consider an infinite tree rooted
at vr. Assume that vr is the information source and the
observed snapshot Y contains at least one infected node. If
e˜(vr, IY) ≤ t1 < t2, the following inequality holds,
max
X[0,t1]∈X˜ (t1)
Pr(X[0, t1]) > max
X[0,t2]∈X˜ (t2)
Pr(X[0, t2]),
where X˜ (t) = {X[0, t]|Y = F(X(t))}. In addition,
t∗vr = e˜(vr, IY) = maxu∈IY d(vr, u),
i.e., t∗vr is equal to the observed infection eccentricity of vr
with respect to IY.
Proof. We adopt the notations defined in [1], which are listed
below:
• C(v) is the set of children of v.
• φ(v) is the parent of node v.
• Yk is the set of infection topologies where the maximum
distance from vr to an infected node is k. All possible
infection topologies are then partitioned into countable
subsets {Yk}.
• Tv is the tree rooted in v.
• T−uv is the tree rooted in v without the branch from its
neighbor u.
• X([0, t], T−uv ) is the sample path restricted to topology
T−uv .
Considering the case where the time difference of two sample
paths is one, we will show that
max
X[0,t]∈X˜ (t)
Pr(X[0, t]) > max
X[0,t+1]∈X˜ (t+1)
Pr(X[0, t+ 1]).
Next, we use induction over Yk.
Step 1 k = 0 vr is the only observed infected node in
this case. Given a sample path X[0, t + 1] ∈ X˜ (t + 1), the
probability of the sample path can be written as
Pr (X[0, t+ 1]) = Pr (X[0, t]) Pr(X(t+ 1)|X[0, t])
Since vr is the only observed infected node and all other
nodes’ states are unknown, we assign X′[0, t] ∈ X˜ (t) to be
7same as the first t time slots in X[0, t + 1], i.e., X′[0, t] =
X[0, t]. Hence, we obtain that
Pr (X′[0, t]) = Pr (X[0, t]) > Pr (X[0, t+ 1])
Therefore, the case k = 0 is proved.
Step 2 Assume the inequality holds for k ≤ n, and consider
k = n + 1, i.e., Y ∈ Yn+1. Clearly, t ≥ n + 1 ≥ 1 for
each X[0, t]. Furthermore, the set of subtrees T = {T−vru |u ∈
C(vr)} are divided into two subsets:
T h = {T−vru |u ∈ C(vr), T−vru ∩ IY = ∅},
and
T i = T \T h.
Given tRvr , the infection processes on the sub-trees are mutually
independent. We construct X′[0, t] which occurs more likely
than X∗[0, t + 1] according to the following steps, where
X∗[0, t+ 1] = maxX[0,t+1]∈X˜ (t+1) Pr(X[0, t+ 1]).
Part 1 T i. For a subtree in T i, the proof follows Step 2.b
and Step 2.c of Lemma 1 in [1]. The intuition is as follows:
Consider a subtree and a sample path on it with duration t+1.
If u is not infected at the first time slot, we can construct a
sample path with duration t by moving the events one time
slot earlier. The new sample path (with duration t) has a higher
probability to occur than the original one. If u is infected in
the first time slot, we can invoke the induction assumption to
the subtree rooted at u, which belongs to Yn.
Part 2 vr. In this part, we have the freedom to assign the
unobserved node as infected or healthy. In Part 1, the infection
time of each root u in subtrees T i of X′[0, t] is either the same
as or one time slot earlier than its infection time in X∗[0, t+1].
Therefore, if tRvr ≤ t, the recovery time of the source vr in
X′[0, t] can be assigned the same as that in X∗[0, t+ 1].
If tRvr = t + 1, the source vr recovers at time slot t + 1
which means vr is not observed since the observation set only
contains infected nodes. Therefore, in X′[0, t] we assign the
source to be in state I at time t, which is the same as the state
of vr at time t in X∗[0, t+ 1].
If tRvr > t + 1, vr remains infected in the sample path
X∗[0, t+1]. We assign the source to be in state I in X′[0, t].
As a summary, according to the assignment above, the states
of the source vr in X′[0, t] are the same as those of the first
t time slots in X∗[0, t+ 1].
Part 3 T h. Based on the conclusion of Part 2, the subtrees
belonging to T h in X′[0, t] mimic the behaviors of the first t
time slots in X∗[0, t+ 1].
Since X∗[0, t+1] has one extra time slot during which some
extra events occur, X′[0, t] occurs with a higher probability on
the subtrees in T h.
According to the discussion above, we conclude that time
inequality holds for k = n+ 1, hence for any k according to
the principle of induction. Therefore, the lemma holds.
Lemma 4. (Adjacent Nodes Inequality) Consider an infinite
tree with partial observation Y which contains at least one
infected node. For u, v ∈ V such that (u, v) ∈ E , if t∗u > t∗v
Pr(X∗u[0, t
∗
u]) < Pr(X
∗
v[0, t
∗
v]),
where X∗u[0, t
∗
u] is the optimal sample path associated with
root u.
Proof. The proof of the lemma follows the proof of Lemma
2 in [1]. The key idea is to construct a sample path rooted at
v, which has a higher probability than the optimal sample
path rooted at u. It is not hard to see that t∗u = t
∗
v + 1
based on the definition of the infection eccentricity. The
graph is partitioned into T−uv and T
−v
u which are mutu-
ally independent after the infection of v and u. With this
observation, we construct X˜v[0, t∗v]) which infects u at the
first time slot. X˜v([0, t∗v], T
−u
v ) then mimics the behavior
of X∗u([0, t
∗
u], T
−u
v ) and X˜v([0, t
∗
v − 1], T−vu ) has a higher
probability than X∗u([0, t
∗
u], T
−v
u ) based on Lemma 3.
The adjacent nodes inequality results in partial orders in the
tree and makes it possible to compare the likelihood of optimal
sample paths associated with adjacent nodes without knowing
the actual probability of the optimal sample path. Following
the proof of Theorem 4 in [1], it can be shown that in tree
networks, from any node, there exists a path from the node
to a Jordan infection center such that the observed infection
eccentricity strictly decreases along the path. By repeatedly
using Lemma 4, we can then prove that the source of the
optimal sample path must be a Jordan infection center.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
In this subsection, we present the proof that shows that
the sample path estimator is within a constant distance from
the actual source independent of the size of the infected
subnetwork. Given a tree rooted in v∗ where the information
starts from v∗ following the general SIR model, we define the
following three branching processes.
1) Zl(Tv∗) denotes the set of nodes which are in infected
or recovered states at level l on tree Tv∗ . Let Zl(Tv∗) denote
the cardinality of Zl(Tv∗). Note that Z0(Tv∗) = {v∗}. We
call this process the original infection process.
2) Zτl (Tv∗) denotes the set of infected and recovered nodes
at level l whose parents are in set Zτl−1(Tv∗) and who were
infected within τ time slots after their parents were infected.
This process adds a deadline τ on infection. If a node is not
infected within τ time slots after its parent is infected, it is
not included in this branching process. This process is called
τ−deadline infection process. From the definition, if u, v ∈
Zτl (Tv∗), then
|tIu − tIv| ≤ l(τ − 1).
For τ = 1, we call Z1l (Tv∗) the one time slot infection
process. The extinction probability of a branching process is
the probability that there is no offspring at certain level of the
branching process, i.e., Z1l (Tv∗) = 0 for some l. Denote by
ρv the extinction probability of Z1l (T
−φ(v)
v ).
3) We define the binomial branching process as a branching
process whose offspring distribution follows binomial distri-
bution B(g, ϕ) where g is the number of trials and ϕ is the
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the binomial branching process.
The following notations will be used in later analysis.
• v† denotes the optimal sample path estimator.
• gmin is the lower bound on the number of children, i.e.,
min
v
|C(v)| ≥ gmin,∀v ∈ V.
• qmin is the lower bound on the infection probability, i.e.,
qmin = min
e
qe,∀e ∈ E .
• στv is the probability that a node v infects at least one of
its children within τ time slot after v is infected.
Given n0 > 0 and τ > 0, define l† = min l′ where
Zτl′(Tv∗) > n0, i.e., l
† is the first level where the τ -deadline
infection process has more than n0 offsprings.
Given τ and level L ≥ 2, we consider the following two
events:
Event 1: ZL(Tv∗) = 0.
Event 2: l† ≤ L and at least two one time slot infection
processes starting from level l† survive, i.e., ∃u, v ∈ Zτl†(Tv∗)
such that ∀l, Z1l (T−φ(u)u ) 6= 0 and Z1l (T−φ(v)v ) 6= 0. In
addition, at least one infected node at the bottom of each
survived one time slot infection process is observed.
For event 1, no node at level L gets infected and the
infection process terminates at level L − 1. So the infection
eccentricity of v∗ is at most L−1, and the minimum infection
eccentricity of the network is at most L − 1. Therefore, the
distance between v∗ and v† is no more than 2(L− 1).
Considering event 2, we assume the information propagates
for t time slots. The deadline property of the τ -deadline
infection process indicates tIu1 ≤ τ l† and tIu2 ≤ τ l†. Given
a node v˜ at level (τ + 1)l† − 1 where v˜ ∈ T−φ(u2)u2 and a
node v′ ∈ T−φ(u1)u1 which is an observed infected node at the
bottom of the infection tree, from Figure 6, we obtain
d(v˜, v′) = t− tIu1 + τ l† + 1
≥ t+ 1.
Note that ∀u ∈ I,
d(v∗, u) ≤ t < d(v˜, v′).
Since l† ≤ L, any node at or below level L(τ +1)− 1 has an
infection eccentricity larger than that of v∗. Hence, v† cannot
be at or below level L(τ + 1)− 1. Therefore,
d(v†, v∗) < (τ + 1)L− 1.
Next, we prove the probability that either event 1 or event 2
happens goes asymptotically to 1. Denote by Kl† the number
of one time slot infection processes which start from level
l† and survive. Denote by E the event that a survived one
time slot infection process has at least one observed infected
node at its lowest level. According to the discussion above,
1 1
Fig. 6: A Pictorial Description of the Distance Relations in
Theorem 2
the probability that the distance between the estimator and the
actual source is no more than (τ + 1)L− 1 is at least
Pr(ZL(Tv∗) = 0) + Pr(Kl† ≥ 2, l† ≤ L) Pr(E)2
≥ Pr(ZL(Tv∗)=0)+Pr
(
l†≤L)Pr(Kl†≥2∣∣∣l†≤L)Pr(E)2
= Pr(ZL(Tv∗) = 0) + Pr
(
L⋃
i=1
Zτi > n0
)
× Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† ≤ L) Pr(E)2
=
(
1−Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
0 < Zτi (Tv∗) ≤ n0
)
−Pr
(
L⋃
i=1
Zτi (Tv∗)=0
))
× Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† ≤ L) Pr(E)2 + Pr(ZL(Tv∗) = 0).
In addition, we have
Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† ≤ L) (2)
=
L∑
l=1
Pr(Kl† ≥ 2, l† = l|l† ≤ L) (3)
=
L∑
l=1
Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† = l) Pr(l† = l|l† ≤ L). (4)
In Lemma 5, we prove that the extinction probability of
each branching process from level l† is upper bounded by
the exitinction probability ρ of the binomial infection process
B(gmin, qmin). Therefore, at level l† we have n0 i.i.d one time
infection processes whose extinction probabilities are upper
bounded by ρ. The probability that at least two of them survive
goes asymptotic to 1 when n0 increases. Therefore, ∀1 > 0,
we have enough large n0, such that
Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† = l) ≥ 1− 1.
Therefore, equation (4) becomes
Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† ≤ L)
≥ (1− 1)
L∑
l=1
Pr(l† = l|l† ≤ L)
= (1− 1).
We show in Lemma 7 that Pr(E) ≥ 1 − 2 given 2 > 0.
If n0 and t are sufficiently large, we have
Pr(Kl† ≥ 2|l† ≤ L) Pr(E)2 ≥ (1− 1)(1− 2)2.
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Pr(ZL(Tv∗) = 0) + Pr(Kl† ≥ 2, l† ≤ L) Pr(E)2 (5)
≥
(
1− Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
0 < Zτi (Tv∗) ≤ n0
))
(6)
× (1− 1)(1− 2)2 (7)
− Pr
(
L⋃
i=1
Zτi (Tv∗) = 0
)
+ Pr(ZL(Tv∗) = 0) (8)
=
(
1− Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
0 < Zτi (Tv∗) ≤ n0
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Part 1
(9)
× (1− 1)(1− 2)2 (10)
+ Pr(ZL(Tv∗) = 0)− Pr(ZτL(Tv∗) = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Part 2
, (11)
where equation (11) holds since Zτl (Tv∗) = 0 implies that
ZτL(Tv∗) = 0 for l ≤ L.
For part 1 in equation (11), we prove in Lemma 6, given
3 > 0, when τ and L are sufficiently large,
1− Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
0 < Zτi (Tv∗) ≤ n0
)
> 1− 3.
For part 2 in equation (11), we have
lim
τ→∞Pr(Z
τ
L(Tv∗) = 0) = Pr(ZL(Tv∗) = 0).
Therefore, given 4 > 0, when τ is sufficiently large,
Pr(ZL(Tv∗) = 0)− Pr(ZτL(Tv∗) = 0) ≥ −4.
Hence, we have
Pr(ZL(Tv∗) = 0) + Pr(Kl† ≥ 2, l† ≤ L) Pr(E)2
≥ (1− 1)(1− 2)2(1− 3)− 4.
Now choosing 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 5/5 for some 4 > 0,
we have
Pr(ZL(Tv∗) = 0) + Pr(Kl† ≥ 2, l† ≤ L) Pr(E)2
≥ 1− 5.
Now let |Y| denote the number of infected nodes in the
observation Y. Define events E1 = {ZL = 0} and E2 =
{Kl ≥ 2 for some l ≤ L} and E3 is the event that two of the
survived one time slot infection processes have at least one
observed infected node each at their bottoms. We have
Pr(E1||Y| ≥ 1) + Pr (E2 ∩ E3||Y| ≥ 1)
=
1
Pr(|Y| ≥ 1) (Pr(E1 ∩ {|Y| ≥ 1})
+Pr (E2 ∩ E3 ∩ {|Y| ≥ 1})) .
Since E2 ∩ E3 implies that |Y| ≥ 1, we have
Pr(E1||Y| ≥ 1) + Pr (E2 ∩ E3||Y| ≥ 1)
=
1
Pr(|Y| ≥ 1) (Pr(E1 ∩ {|Y| ≥ 1}) + Pr (E2 ∩ E3))
=
1
Pr(|Y| ≥ 1) (Pr(E1)− Pr(E1 ∩ {|Y| = 0})
+Pr (E2 ∩ E3))
≥ 1
Pr(|Y| ≥ 1) (Pr(E1)− Pr({|Y| = 0}) + Pr (E2 ∩ E3))
≥ 1
Pr(|Y| ≥ 1) (Pr({|Y| ≥ 1})− 5)
=1− 5
Pr(|Y| ≥ 1) .
Note that Pr(|Y| ≥ 1) is a positive constant since the one
time slot infection process starting from the information source
survives with non-zero probability. The theorem holds by
choosing 5 = Pr(|Y| ≥ 1).
Lemma 5. The extinction probability of an one time slot
infection process is smaller than the extinction probability of
a binomial branching process B(gmin, qmin), i.e., ∀v ∈ V,
ρv < ρ.
Proof. As shown in Figure 7, we construct a virtual
source process Z(vs)l (T
−φ(v)
v ) and a min-infection process
Z
(mi)
l (T
−φ(v)
v ) as auxiliary processes over the same tree
topology where Y (vs)v and Y
(mi)
v are the binary numbers
indicating whether node v has been infected. Denote by ρ(vs)v
and ρ(mi)v the extinction probabilities, respectively.
In the min-infection process, infection spreads over edges
with probability qmin. In the virtual source process, the prob-
ability that a node gets infected is
Pr(Y (vs)v =1) = Pr(Y
(mi)
v =1)+Pr(Y
(mi)
v = 0)·
quv − qmin
1− qmin
= quv,
i.e., for each node u ∈ C(v), v tries to infects u with
probability qmin. If v fails to infect u, a virtual source v′ tries
to infect u with probability qvu−qmin1−qmin . Therefore, the virtual
source process has the same distribution with the one time
slot infection process.
We now couple the min-infection process and the virtual
source infection process as follows:
• If Y (mi)v = 1, then Y
(vs)
v = 1.
• If Y (mi)v = 0, then Y
(vs)
v = 1 with probability quv−qmin1−qmin .
Since a node is more likely to get infected in the virtual source
infection process, we obtain
ρ(vs)v ≤ ρ(mi)v .
Recalling the one time slot infection process has the same
distribution with the virtual source branching process, we
obtain ρv ≤ ρ(mi)v ,∀v.
In addition, the min-infection process has more children
than the binomial branching process with the same infection
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Fig. 7: A Pictorial Description of the Two Auxiliary Processes
in Lemma 5
probability for each children. It is obvious that the binomial
branching process is more likely to die out, i.e., ρ(mi)v < ρ.
As a summary, we prove
ρv < ρ.
Lemma 6. Assume ∃ξ > 0 such that στv < 1 − ξ,∀v ∈ V.
Given any  > 0, there exists a constant L′ such that for any
L ≥ L′,
Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
0 < Zτi (Tv∗) ≤ n0
)
≤ 
Proof. Follows the same argument of Lemma 7 in [1], by
choosing
L′ =
⌈
log 
log (1− ξn0)
⌉
,
we obtain for any L ≥ L′,  > 0
Pr
(
L⋂
i=1
0 < Zτi (Tv∗) ≤ n0
)
≤ .
Lemma 7. For any  > 0, there exists a sufficiently large t
such that
Pr(E) ≥ 1− 
Proof. Note the binomial branching process B(gmin, qmin) is a
Galton-Watson (GW) process [11] which requires each node
has an i.i.d offspring distribution. The previous result about
the instability of the Galton-Watson process in Theorem 6.2
in [11] proves that the GW process either goes to infinity
or goes to 0. If the GW process survives, the number of
offsprings goes to infinity as the level increases. Therefore, for
sufficiently long time, the survived binomial branching process
will have a sufficiently large number of offsprings at the lowest
level. Since the one time slot infection process always has at
least the same number of children as the binomial branching
process, the survived one time slot infection process will have
enough number of infected nodes at the lowest level as time
increases. According to the unbiased property of the partial
observation, after sufficiently long time, the probability that at
least one infected node in the lowest level is observed goes to
1 asymptotically, i.e.,
Pr(E) ≥ 1− .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of detecting the
information source in a heterogeneous SIR model with sparse
observations. We proved that the optimal sample path estima-
tor on an infinite tree is a node with the minimum infection
eccentricity with partial observations. With a fairly general
condition, we proved that the estimator is within constant
distance from the actual information source with a high
probability with a sparse observation. Extensive simulation
results showed our estimator outperforms other algorithms
significantly.
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